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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of non-state nations’ identity and agency with regard to relations 
with their host nation states. The particular focus here is on the means by which such regions 
might express their individuality. To this end, we employ a comparative case study analysis of two 
non-state nations with a range of differing yet in other ways similar qualities – namely Wales (UK) 
and Sardinia (Italy). We suggest that this is a valuable exercise, allowing as it does for the 
exploring of evidence ‘on the ground’ of the processes involved. The conceptual rationale for 
the paper is provided by new regionalism – regions as actors beyond the nation state. Following 
this, the idea of the ‘territorial policy community’ is presented as a point of departure, with the 
scope of the paper being to develop a diachronic framework for regional change. Given the focus 
on identity and interest articulation, the role of regional political parties is a particular subject of 
the empirical investigation, with non-state nations and nation states linked by opportunistic 
relationships based on political and electoral support. We then consider what this might mean 
with regard to the capacity of non-state nations to build on the past to successfully negotiate 
future policy-making agendas. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of the study, and consider the 
implications of its findings for further research  agendas. 
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Introduction 
The authors of this paper have spent perhaps more time than they might care to remember 
residing in, observing, studying and in some small ways participating in the economic and 
political lives of the two case study regions that are presented herein. To this end, we 
consider political, economic and structural change taking place within two  European  
regions – Wales (UK) and Sardinia (Italy) which are in some ways similar and yet very 
different in others, a mix which it is hoped offers a degree of comparability on the one hand 
while providing for useful contrast on the other. The over-arching motivation here is thus an 
attempt to make sense of the ongoing changes taking place within our home regions in 
relation to a broader context in terms of both theory and geography, the ultimate aim being 
address the following research questions: how can we better understand what has happened 
in the past, what future developments might therefore be likely? Does this have any impli- 
cations for policy at the regional level – and indeed the nation state level given the limited 
ability of regional actors, even within the most functional of regions, to effect such changes? 
Finally, although not intended to be generalisable in any scientific sense of the word, it is 
nonetheless a desired outcome that the findings shed some light beyond the two regions 
considered in this  paper. 
The broad context for this paper is that of the restructuring of the state (Hudson, 1998) 
which has occurred in parallel to the shift towards a globalised, knowledge-based economy 
which all developed nations have experienced (albeit unevenly) over the past three decades 
(Amin, 2002; Brenner, 1999; Cooke et al., 2001). These trends can be summarised as involv- 
ing the increased mobility of physical products, of knowledge, and both  financial  and 
human forms of capital (Florida, 2002; Giddens, 2002). The spatial patterns of this new 
economy are revealing themselves to be evermore ‘spiky’ (Florida, 2005), urban-focused and 
self-reinforcing in terms of their agglomerations (Storper, 2013). Unsurprisingly, these 
developments have seen the further divergence of peripheral regions from their respective 
economic cores in terms of their relative performance (Martin, 2015); perhaps less antici- 
pated has been the emergence of greater degrees of variation within states than between  
them (Pugh, 2017), clearly highlighting the potential value of comparisons at sub-state level 
in terms of relationships to the nation state. Put bluntly – such circumstances would appear  
to reveal the central state as either unwilling or unable to address these disparities. 
Simultaneously, by implication the regions in question are also lacking the capacity for 
remedial action, which may be due to internal inadequacies, the nature of its external 
relations with the nation state, or indeed beyond it. These are clearly questions worthy of 
consideration. 
At the risk of over simplification, regional economic development policy within this 
climate has fallen into two broadly distinct strands – the attraction of mobile inward invest- 
ment, and the upgrading of indigenous skills and entrepreneurial capacity (Brooksbank        
et al., 2001; Pugh, 2014). These are of course not mutually exclusive policy repertoires 
(Morgan, 2016) but the former generally precedes the latter, albeit along different time- 
frames in different regions. A relatively recent policy sub-theme has been the attraction of 
mobile knowledge workers (aka the ‘creative class’ of Florida, 2002) and to a lesser   extent, 
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related to this and depending on the region in question, the attraction of tourism and its 
related activities. While for former industrial regions (e.g. Wales), the focus of inward 
investment has typically been on the rapid replacement of jobs lost in these sectors, and  
more latterly the attraction (and retention) of occupations higher up the value chain (such as 
in finance and professional services), more rural regions (Sardinia being an example) have 
been required to address different challenges; while not having to overcome the deeply 
embedded legacies of prior regime of production, they typically possess few options to   
build on in transitioning to a more knowledge-based economy (Asheim et al., 2011). 
Conversely, regions faced with deindustrialisation face the conundrum of reconciling large-
scale (likely unembedded) job replacement in the short run with longer term develop- ment 
goals. Operationalising these policies has in some cases been the job of dedicated regional 
executive bodies (the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) in Wales for example) or 
alternatively that of agencies of the national state acting on a basis of limited functional 
decentralisation. 
At the European level, regional policy has generally reinforced the knowledge-based 
model of development, emphasising skills, and innovation and entrepreneurial capacity 
building, with varying degrees of success (Brooksbank et al., 2001; Cooke and Clifton, 
2005), the latest incarnation enshrined in the agenda  of  ‘smart  specialisation’  (Pugh,  
2014). Significantly, there is evidence that the quality and appropriateness of local institu- 
tions is an important factor in the success of regional development policy (Rodr'ıguez-Pose, 
2013), a theme to which we return later in this paper. Ultimately, the over-arching theme of 
development programmes at the European level is towards cohesion via reducing regional 
disparities in economic performance rather than the promotion of any sub-state national-  
ism; that said an increased level of sub-state level subsidiarity may be required for successful 
policy implementation. Moreover, there is a spatial tension between the regional and nation 
state levels inherent within development models derived from this so-called ‘new economic 
geography’ (Krugman, 2011) approach – i.e. stressing increasing returns to scale from 
agglomeration. This is particularly acute within the UK which has seen over four decades    
of divergent  sub-national  performance  (Martin, 2015). 
There has been a contemporaneous breakdown of what can be termed spatial 
Keynesianism (Keating, 2017), i.e. the idea that regional inequalities  were  largely  the  
result of weakness in demand for a region’s goods and services and therefore could be 
addressed by redistributive spending by the central state. Thus from the 1980s in the UK – 
typically later elsewhere within Europe – there was a shift towards the supply-side concerns 
(as noted above-skills, innovation) that more recent policies have sought to address. 
Consistent with these developments, we have seen the rise of what Keating (1998) termed 
the ‘new regionalism’, entailing regions as actors beyond nation state in their own right, and 
in direct competition with each other both within and outside their own nation state. 
With the above in mind, employing a comparative study to investigate the role of struc- 
ture in shaping expressions of, and responses to, sub-state nationhood offers the potential to 
be an interesting and hopefully valuable exercise, not least as it allows for the exploration of 
some evidence of processes at work ‘on the ground’. In particular, the focus on non-state 
nations should allow for the interaction between institutions and identity to be revealed. 
Thus, it is suggested that Wales and Sardinia are interesting and relevant examples, not least 
as they bring together distinct European cultures and varieties of capitalism as per Soskice 
and Hall (2001) (Northern European vs. Mediterranean, liberal market economy vs. coor- 
dinated market economy), but also quite different state structures and traditions – central- 
ism in the UK (albeit asymmetrically devolved since the late 1990s), as opposed to 
federalism with strong municipalities in Italy. Moreover, we suggest that there is significant 
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value in studying ‘ordinary regions’ rather than the, in fact, much rarer exemplars of 
unquestionable success and/or best practice (Hepburn, 2011; Hospers and Benneworth, 
2005). At this point, we should add a note of caution against overestimating the capacity      
of regional institutions to influence outcomes at the regional level. For example, the UK 
Treasury calculates that total public spending in Wales is around £10,000 per head; approx- 
imately, half this figure is spending that the Welsh Government has discretion over 
(although not directly comparable, figures from Eurostat show that the Sardinian public 
sector spends around e17,000 per head). However, within this, the major proportion is 
allocated to health and education. Although there is a large indirect impact via these activ- 
ities (salaries, purchasing and so on), there is relatively little resource available to pursue 
programmes of real discretion such as economic development policy. On this point, the 
recent launch of the Development Bank for Wales suggested an investment fund of £440m 
over a 10-year period. This is not the only vehicle for economic development within the 
region but nonetheless indicates the relatively small scale of such   activities. 
Thus, the paper proceeds as follows; in the following Section ‘Rescaling interests: 
Restructuring the state and new regionalism’, we provide a review of the literature on       
new regionalism and the rescaling of the nation state. In brief, economic development pol- 
icies are strongly influenced by what Keating et al. (2009) term ‘territorial policy commu- 
nities’, i.e. the legacies of identity and locally inherited institutional frameworks, policy 
regimes, and regulatory practices. Thus, Keating’s notion of the territorial policy commu- 
nity serves as a point of departure, with the scope of the paper being to elaborate the kind of 
diachronic framework called for by Atkinson and Coleman (1992), rather than to provide    
an empirical investigation of these communities per se. There then follows in the Section 
‘Methodological approach: Analytical framework and case selection’, a more detailed expla- 
nation of the methodology adopted, including the rationale for the selection of case studies, 
and a summary of the analytical framework developed. Following on from this, the Section 
‘Wales and Sardinia – Comparative cases in non-state nation restructuring’ presents a com- 
parative analysis of Wales and Sardinia, with the ‘Discussion’ relating the comparative 
material back to the research questions outlined in ‘Methodological approach: Analytical 
framework and case selection’. Finally, in the Conclusions, we reflect on the findings and 
their implications for further   research. 
 
Rescaling interests: Restructuring the state and new  regionalism 
As described by Keating (1998) and developed in subsequent work (Keating, 2009; Keating 
and Wilson, 2014), markets, international institutions and trans-national corporations 
increasingly penetrate state borders; national economic management is thus complicated    
(or indeed confounded) by the increased mobility of all forms of capital. Keating argues 
however that this does not in itself imply the end of territory as an organising principle – 
rather it is reconfigured as ‘new regionalism’. The two key features of this new regionalism 
are first that regions are no longer confined within the borders of their nation state, thus 
becoming actors beyond it in their own right, and second that regions are increasingly in 
competition with each other as a result of which they may be transformed largely into 
systems of economic development. Lovering (1999) takes this idea a step further by suggest- 
ing that the active promotion of the region as the ‘imagined unit of competition’ at the 
expense of the imagined ‘national community’ by associated vested interests actually  renders 
new regionalism itself as instrumental (unwittingly or otherwise) in the dismantling of redis- 
tributive structures at the national level. The extent to which ‘national community’ ever 
existed is of course debatable, as is the degree to which the (re)assertion of regional  identity 
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may now challenge such notions; answers to questions such as these will of course vary from 
case to case. 
Tomaney (2000) has pointed out that although national coherence was indeed augmented 
in the immediate post-war period, regions had been actively involved in shaping their host 
nation states; i.e. they were not just passively subsumed therein – their interests and political 
structures had to be accommodated to a greater or lesser degree by the enhanced nation 
states. By the 1960s, however, nation states were dealing with the need to modernise eco- 
nomic structures while simultaneously addressing geographical inequalities. Thus as 
Tomaney puts it, new regionalism came to the fore because ‘territorial relationships are       
no longer manageable by existing forms of accommodation and exchange’ (498). What is 
clear is that fundamental to the emergence of new regionalism is the breakdown of the post- 
war spatial Keynesianism model of territorial management (Keating, 2017), the fundamen- 
tal aim of which was to integrate lagging regions within the nation state. Thus, policies were 
‘depoliticized and integrative’ (Keating, 2017: 11) with largely technocratic justifications, 
operationalised by development agencies with centrally allocated resources. From the 1980s, 
however, increasing international flows meant that the internal (i.e. within nation sate) 
recycling logic of transfers from rich regions to poor ones began to break down. Put sim- 
plistically, increased spending in lagging regions was more likely to leak out of the nation 
state via imports than it was to be retained via increased demand and associated multiplier 
effects. This neo-liberalisation has implied a shift from publicly planned solutions to market- 
oriented ones or, at least, ones serving private companies and their customer groups 
(Bradbury, 2007; Sager, 2011). As Keating (2017) has noted, policy makers have sort to 
rebut such critiques by broadening their associated measures of regional ‘competitiveness’ to 
include other factors beyond those relating directly to production costs (e.g. social, envi- 
ronmental and cultural aspects as per Florida, 2002) – but, ultimately, these are all assumed 
to  enhance  regional productivity. 
The idea has persisted though that interests deriving from class, sector and so on would 
ultimately trump those based on territory; meaning that even after regional governments   
had begun to arise they would be rather redundant ‘regions without regionalism’ (Pastori, 
1980) as these supposedly dominant affiliations would continue to be manifested on the 
national scale. The outcomes however appear more complex, with these interests appearing 
not to displace territory, but rather being ‘refracted’ by it in new ways, influenced by the  
dual factors of regional government and the rescaling of functional (economic, social) 
systems (Keating, 2014a, 2017). 
The key point regarding purely functional decentralisation is that in the end the regional  
is always outranked by the national. Keating (1998) has distinguished between different 
types of regional government with functional decentralisation at one end of a continuum   
(i.e. specific agencies for local tasks in combination with decentralised arms of national 
government) and federalism at the other. However, the lines  between  incorporating  
‘strong’ regionalism vs. those of ‘weak’ regionalism have become  somewhat  blurred,  
which led him to the later conclusion that ‘.. .the degree of self-government desired is an 
empirical question to be examined in context, not a defining feature’ (Keating, 2017: 13). 
This in turn naturally raises the vexed question of identity, with regions as ‘sites of social 
identity formation, which can be integrative or autonomist’ (Keating, 2017). As  noted 
above, the latter (i.e. autonomist tendencies) began to emerge in the  1970s,  while  the 
former (the integrative focus) was conceived historically as contingent to the broader ‘mod- 
ernising project’ of government, such that territorial integration and functional differenti- 
ation were seen as normative manifestations of progress (cf. regionalism as the ‘revolt 
against modernity’ of Lipset, 1975). Further blurred lines distinguish regionalisms from 
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minority nationalisms, with the latter typically concomitant with separatism, as traditionally 
the term ‘nation’ was used as an implicit shorthand for the right to self-determination. Thus, 
those seeking self-determination purposefully employed the term. Now, it is largely accepted 
that sovereignty is a more complex issue, which means that even in places with strong 
regional-nationalist movements, the majority of the populace have developed dual identities 
rather than mutually exclusive ones. In turn, all this means that identity is ‘.. .not a given... 
but another field by which regions can be constructed and given meaning’ (Guinjoan and 
Rodon, 2016: 14). 
The nexus of identity and function produces then what we might term a variety of regions 
and of regionalism. Adopting the typology of Keating (1998, 2013, 2014b) produces three 
broad groupings; the historic ‘non-state nations’ such as the Basque Country, Galicia, 
Scotland, and Wales but also including a sub-group of regions with distinct linguistic or 
historical identity but without ‘national pretensions’ – the Italian special status regions 
(including Sardinia) featuring here; second, regions defined primarily by their possession    
of an effective set of internal institutions (the stronger of the German Lander being the most 
obvious example); and finally, a third group which are largely administrative only and thus 
not regions in any other sense (such as the bulk of the English regions). Moreover, attitudes 
to regionalism at the nation state level also play a role – for example, the Italian state as a 
relatively late construct comprising strong regions in contrast to the UK as a long-standing   
if asymmetric union; thus traditions and histories    matter. 
In summary, before the 1990s, regionalism was largely concerned with the accommoda- 
tion of internal (i.e. nation state) inequalities and related functional pressures. Subsequently, 
‘new’ regionalism has reflected a shifting focus towards international markets and the 
emerging European level, with regions themselves conceived therein as actors in their own 
right. This thinking has become more nuanced in recent years via the role of contextual and 
identity factors, such that both the dismissal of territory on the one hand and territorial 
determinism on the other are mitigated (Keating,   2017). 
 
The territorial policy community 
Turning attention directly to formation of policy, the term ‘policy community’ is employed  
to describe the actors, institutions and relationships that are at work here. Potentially, this 
includes all those with interests in shaping and delivering policy (representative bodies of 
industries, sectors and professions, trade unions, political parties and governmental bodies, 
as per Wilks and Wright, 1987). However, the term ‘community’ also implies a degree of 
consensus and coherence (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), which in turn suggests that the policy 
community  is  not just  a structural  entity  but also behavioural one. 
The emergence of new regionalism, the reassertion of regional image and identity and the 
formation of a policy community that is regionally embedded represent interconnected 
aspects of the restructuring of relations between the region and the  nation state. To  this  
end, Keating et al. (2009) introduce the idea of the territorial policy community, emerging in 
response to the rescaling of government; there is no implication here that articulation via 
sector or territory need be mutually exclusive or indeed zero sum. The concept of a terri- 
torial policy community is consistent with thinking around new regionalism in that if these 
regions were indeed without regionalism we would expect to observe little change at this 
level, i.e. with interest articulation largely continuing at the national level. The counter 
assumption to this being from the purely functional perspective, such that any regional 
differences that reveal themselves in the politics of interest articulation would derive from 
the respective sectoral/class distributions therein rather than being related to any defining 
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aspects of the territory per se. Such an observation makes the comparison of two regions 
which are in some ways similar but in others different a potentially fruitful exercise. A 
further possibility would be the opportunistic ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1991) at different levels by actors seeking influence – as Keating et al. (2009) note, the new 
regionalism literature actually does not clearly specify the institutions and interactions that 
produce policy. The constituents of the policy subsystem at the regional level will be medi- 
ated by behavioural variables such as strategy, the degree of consensus, shared norms and 
the like. This in turn suggests that identity and notions of nationhood will temper manifes- 
tations of new regionalism, particularly for the group of non-state nations and their respec- 
tive host nation states, which are effectively ‘caught’ between different scales of action as 
outlined above – in the words of Keating et al. (2009: 53) ‘.. .the regulation of different 
policy fields at different levels challenges the old social compromises of the state’. With this 
in mind, the study presented here has a particular focus on regional polities and (local) 
governing parties as key actors within territorial interest articulation, policy formation and 
delivery at the regional level. Relevant questions to consider here are how the nation state 
might respond to these sub-national challenges, and indeed what its capacity is to do so, 
given the embedded or indeed path-dependant courses of action available. 
 
Methodological approach: Analytical framework and case  selection 
Having provided an overview of the literature relating to the concept of new regionalism in 
the previous section, and explored what implications this might have for regions which are 
simultaneously experiencing economic change and a shifting set of relations with their ‘host’ 
nation state, attention is now turned towards an  analytical  framework  for  investigating 
these processes in action, and the selection of suitable comparative settings within which     
to do so. As we saw in the section above, interest articulation can occur on a sector or a 
territorial basis, with these channels not mutually exclusive and indeed simultaneously avail- 
able, and with venue-shopping possible in terms of the spatial level deemed most appropri- 
ate by the actors in question. Moreover, no normative progression from the territorial to the 
functional can be inferred, rather outcomes are mediated by regional identity which in turn 
may be autonomist or integrative. The fact that divergence within nation states is often 
greater than between them suggests inability, unwillingness or a combination of the two by 
actors at both the regional and national state levels to address these outcomes, while policy  
at the European level ostensibly promotes regional cohesion while itself relying on effective 
local institutions for delivery. Thus, we suggest that the analysis presented here is all the 
more pertinent. 
To this end, a framework for analysis is outlined in Figure 1, relating  to  non-state 
nations, institutions, identity, and structure. At the centre of  the  framework  is  the  non-
state nation, representing a particular case of new regionalism – i.e. one in which the 
functional and structural aspects of rescaling are most subject to refraction, using the ter- 
minology of Keating (2017), via regional culture and identity. All non-state nations are not 
the same of course, hence the value of comparison. Given the two-way nature of the rela- 
tionship between region and nation state, the context of the latter is important. As noted 
earlier, nation states will vary in their own internal structures, cultures, norms and indeed 
varieties of capitalism, linked to the nature of their restructuring. Similarly, regarding the 
context within which economic development is taking place, again as outlined earlier old 
industrial regions (for example) have different priorities to those transitioning from a more 
rural economy, strategies focused on inward investment and job replacement are likely to 
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Figure 1.  Non-state nations, institutions and identity: a conceptual  framework. 
 
imply a differing set of institutions, relationships, and interest articulation than those more 
focused  on bottom-up capacity  development. 
 
Wales and Sardinia as illustrative cases 
As noted in the ‘Introduction’, the authors have a long-standing interest and a degree of 
embedded knowledge in the two regions we seek to compare here – Wales and Sardinia. 
Although useful, and important as a motivating factor this is of course not a sufficient 
rationale for the selection of these two case studies; to this end, we offer some further 
justification here. To briefly sketch out the comparative economic contexts of the two 
regions, Wales has a population of 3.1 m (5% of the UK) while for Sardinia the correspond- 
ing figures are 1.6 m and 3%, respectively, their geographical areas being similar; GDP in 
Wales is approximately e24,000 per head, just over e20,000 for   Sardinia. 
The UK is a centrist nation state, which has undergone limited and asymmetric restruc- 
turing (devolution – including Wales) during the past two decades; conversely, Italy main- 
tains a federalist structure albeit with partially developed devolution – there are five ‘special’ 
regions, one of which is Sardinia. The UK operates a liberal market economy emphasising 
flexibility and financialisation while the Italian model is more coordinated (corporatist and 
negotiated). Within these, both Wales and Sardinia both meet the criteria of  non-state 
nations albeit with some significant differences with reference to Keating’s (1998) typology 
of regions, Wales being a historic or ‘type 1’ non-state nation along with  Scotland,  
Catalonia  and  the Basque Country, while Sardinia  is ‘type  2’, i.e. also possessing   distinct 
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Figure 2.  Rationale and case study  selection. 
 
language and regional identity but essentially lacking in widely articulated separatist ten- 
dencies. This is represented graphically in Figure  2. 
While Wales is a peripheral former industrial region (at least in the south, the north and 
the west being more rural), Sardinia is an island in the Mediterranean which has undergone 
a more recent nation state-led industrial shift. There are also some parallels with regard to 
infrastructure particularly in relation to transport; while in Sardinia this has historically 
been neglected, Wales has good links on an east-west basis – connecting with the regional 
economies of south west and north west England – while travelling between north and south 
within Wales is problematic by road and rail. This hints at differential aspects of the pre- 
vious spatial Keynesian consensus; within Sardinia as an island the upgrading of transport 
infrastructure was of little benefit to the wider nation state, while for Wales it offered greater 
scope for spillovers. Conversely, the imagined national community of Italy was manifested 
in its most extreme sense with the fascist autocracy, although the north/south divide 
remained the main schism in the post-war period (Keating, 1998). 
 
Research questions and analytical approach 
From the sections above, we can distil the following research questions, the addressing of 
which in a comparative approach is intended to shed light upon the role of structure in both 
shaping expressions of, and responses to, sub-state    nationhood. 
 
• What are the consequences of functional and economic rescaling at the regional level and 
how can we better understand both past events and possible future trajectories? 
• How are territorial policy communities rescaling and what might this mean for policy at 
the regional level? 
• More generally what does this mean with regard to the capacity of devolved regions to 
successfully negotiate future policy-making agendas, given the limited ability of regional 
actors, even within the most functional of regions, to effect such changes? 
• Finally, although not intended to be generalisable in any scientific sense of the word, it is 
nonetheless a desired outcome that the findings shed some light beyond the two regions 
considered in this  paper. 
 
We seek to address these questions by exploring evidence of processes ‘on the ground’ in 
the two regions, via the authors’ own contextualised knowledge, the review of policy docu- 
ments and of the specific academic literature on the two regions. This evidence is then 
reviewed comparatively in relation to the  framework  set  out in  Figure  1. The  approach 
we take here is consistent with conceiving the relationship between endogenous choice   and 
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exogenous process as not being one of mutual exclusivity. In other words, in relation to 
changes within prevailing economic models and the associated institutions thereof, these are 
not viewed as two distinct evolutionary routes, rather they are necessarily inter-linked, as   
per Mokyr (2016). Thus, the shift towards a knowledge-based economy does not imply an 
inevitable process within which domestic development agencies are essentially redundant, 
conversely nor does it imply a prescribed set of ideological choices with a consequent suite of 
institutional outcomes. Mokyr’s concept of choice-based evolution builds on Jones’ (2006) 
work on culture and economics which views culture (broadly defined) as neither a fixed 
exogenous environment constraining behaviour, nor one that is perfectly malleable to 
economic needs. Such a model of evolutionary change also implies complementary but    
also competing mechanisms for the transmission of new ideas; vertical transmission is large- 
ly based upon socialisation (i.e. from one generation to the next) while horizontal transmis- 
sion is driven more by peer to peer learning – which although it involves choice is itself 
subject to a (spatially and temporally non-uniform) degree of constraint. Thus, Mokyr’s 
analogy here is choice but from a ‘pre-existing menu’ (2016: 35). Having outlined the meth- 
odological approach, selection of cases, variables to be considered and key research ques- 
tions arising, attention  is  now  turned  to  the  two  regions  in  question,  namely  Wales  
and Sardinia. 
 
Wales and Sardinia – Comparative cases in non-state 
nation  restructuring 
Brief overview of restructuring and development  context 
With regard to economic history, there are parallels but also chronological shifts between  
the two regions; these are shown in summary in Table 1. While in Wales mining dominated 
in the late 19th-century with a transition to heavy industry in the 1930s, in Sardinia, these 
two steps took place respectively in the 1930s (with the fascist autocracy) and in the post-war 
period with the Rebirth Plan. The relative failure of this plan being apparent during the 
1990s, at which point Wales was well into the cycle  of  FDI  replacing  now  declining 
heavy industries. 
From the institutional perspective, the chronology is reversed as Sardinia became an 
Autonomous Region in 1947 while the Welsh Assembly was not formulated until 1999 – 
only since then has regional development policy been self-determined. The Welsh 
Government became responsible for regional  policy  and  the  establishment of structures 
for this function, albeit limited to  the  expenditure  of  the  UK  government block  grant,  
and facing a difficult transition from policy delivery to policy formulation responsibilities, as 
per Cooke and Clifton (2005). In contrast, in Sardinia, the adoption of a more radical stance 
by the independence movement and their alliance-building in order to counter nation-state 
industrial policy led to an early electoral success
1 
followed by a progressive marginalisation 
of these movements and their policy proposals (on issues such as bilingual- ism and the 
establishing of a free-trade zone) (Demuro et al., 2013; Pala, 2012; Roux, 2006). 
It should be noted that the UK ‘union state’ was highly centralised  in  the  post-war 
period, with the Scottish and Welsh offices as functional arms of the Westminster govern- 
ment – charged with the implementation of policy rather than its formation. The more 
developed territorial policy community in Scotland arose from distinct legal and financial 
institutions predating formal devolution, which allowed the pursuing of a more ‘visionary’ 
approach to policy-making under devolution as opposed to the more ‘precautionary’ one in 
Wales (Cooke and Clifton, 2005), which was largely around the mitigation of continuing 
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Table 1. Wales and Sardinia: summary of state restructuring and economic development context. 
Time period Wales Sardinia 
1930s •   Shift from mining to related heavy 
industries 
• Initial nationalist party support 
(Plaid Cymru) 
 
1940s •   Hierarchical planning models 
established 
 
 
1960s •  Establishment of 
Development Districts 
1970s •   Closure of Regional Economic 
Councils 
• Two tier administrative system in 
the UK 
• First devolution referendum (1979) 
• Mining industry dominates, also 
traditional crafts, agriculture 
• Initial nationalist party support 
(Sardinian Party of Action/Partito 
Sardo d’Azione) 
• Hierarchical planning models estab- 
lished 
• Becomes Autonomous 
Region (1947) 
• Rebirth Plan – top-down transition 
to heavy industries 
• Regional Policy in a ‘steady state’ 
• Suppression of customs, language 
1970s/80s •   Increased central control •   EU and subsidiarity – associated 
with transfer of power and 
responsibilities 
• Increased pressure for autonomy 
1990s •   Increased pressure for autonomy 
• Creation of Unitary Authorities 
• Pressure for autonomy – 2nd 
devolution referendum (1997) 
• ‘Asymmetric’ devolution in the UK- 
Establishment of Welsh Assembly 
Govt (1999) 
 
2000s •   Objective 1 funding comes on- 
stream 
• Quangos abolished (WDA, WTB) 
2010s •   Silk Commission on increased 
devolved powers 
• Relative failure of industries pro- 
moted via Rebirth Plan 
• Electoral reform 
• Official recognition of the Sardinian 
language (1999) 
• Additionality – EU programs con- 
sidered by regional governments as 
additional interventions 
• Phasing out of Objective 1 
• Rise of ‘Progetto Sardegna’ 
(Sardinian project) 
• Stalling of identity-based politics 
 
 
 
 
large-scale job losses in traditional industries. The expressly anti-federalist intent of the 
devolution settlement suggests the continuance of a unitary state model based on 
Westminster sovereignty albeit only modified asymmetrically by devolution (Cooke and 
Clifton, 2005; Hogwood, 2003). 
Despite this, in Welsh and Sardinian policy certain similarities can be seen. First, an 
industrial past with subsequent national government intervention through programs for 
disadvantaged areas, sometimes ‘top-down’ and without buy-in from local authorities, 
enough to raise fears of ’internal colonisation’ by the State (Davies, 1987; Palloni, 1979). 
Second, the influence of autonomist movements and EU programs on devolution processes, 
in terms of the recognition of regional self-determination and strategic approaches to policy 
planning. Finally, the adoption of spatial policies in the face of globalisation, especially with 
iconic regeneration projects in the regional capital (although in Sardinia this process has 
been inhibited by the economic crisis in the late   2000s). 
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Turning to more cultural and political aspects, during the 1970s Sardinia saw the active 
suppression of customs and language; this occurred much earlier in Wales from the 19th- 
century into the early 20th, although more passively so through until the 1970s. The rise of 
‘Progetto Sardegna’ (Sardinian project) in the 2000s saw the revival of language, crafts and 
traditions for economic ends including tourism. There are some parallels here with the 
cultural resurgence seen in Wales during the mid-2000s (Clifton, 2011); although this was 
less overtly political in Wales. Finally, the nationalist political parties have experienced 
mixed fortunes, with Plaid Cymru (Wales) reaching a steady state after gains in the early 
days of devolution (21% of the vote and 12 seats of 60 in the present National Assembly), 
which is to be contrasted with the Sardinian Party of Action (Partito Sardo  d’Azione, 
Psd’Az) which after strong beginnings is now very much a minority  party  polling  at  
around 5%. By way of comparison, the  Scottish  National  Party  achieved  47%  of  the  
vote and just under half the seats in the most recent Scottish Parliament elections. It is      
also the largest party in Scotland in the most recent Westminster elections (UK level). 
 
Functional rescaling 
Following a period of ineffective national economic programs, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
both UK and Italian governments considered increased regional subsidiarity. In Italy, 
reforms were essentially progressive as powers and responsibilities were transferred to 
Provinces and Municipalities (although not always accompanied by adequate resources).     
In the UK, conversely, administrative reforms were largely conservative and focused on 
enhancing central state control over local authorities’ policy making, in particular in urban 
recovery and renewal. 
During the late 1990s, both UK and Italian governments attempted to redress the defi- 
ciencies of their respective administrative frameworks. In the former case with the intro- 
duction of Unitary Authorities (1996) and in the latter via electoral reform (1999) and  
further constitutional reform (2001). The asymmetric  devolution process in the UK was  
also brought to fruition during this period    (1999). 
In the immediate post-war period, both Italy and the UK possessed hierarchical admin- 
istrative systems in which local authorities/municipalities were the central players while 
regions were still linked to manifestations of national planning, such as the Development 
Districts
2 
in Sardinia and Regional Economic Councils (1965–1969) in Wales. The former 
were spatial units which joined urban and economic planning on the basis of local territory 
functions while Regional Economic Councils were regional bodies charged by the 
Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in Westminster to draft regional planning policies 
implementing the National Development Plan (Fried, 1968; Gilg,   2005).  
Thus, since the late 1990s both Sardinian and Welsh non-state nation governments had 
significant control on the spending and administration of a central government budget at 
regional level. However, during this period, they encountered a new challenge – coordinat- 
ing EU funding programs (most significantly Objective 1) and initiatives to be delivered at 
local authority level. For this purpose, Welsh Government (WG) adopted a precautionary 
economic policy largely confined to the reorganisation of administrative apparatus. In 2005, 
for example, WG abolished three economic development quangos, the WDA, the Training 
Agency (ELWa) and the Wales Tourist Board (WTB) with their functions re-absorbed 
centrally due to concerns over their performance (Cooke and Clifton, 2005; Gilg, 2005, 
Morgan, 2013). Conversely, in Italy, regional governments typically employed EU structur- 
al funds as ‘additional measures’ in continuity with national intervention in the South.   
While  this  decentralised  some  responsibilities  (within  rules,  however,  rigidly  codified), 
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it did give central government the power to assess the adequacy of the programs drawn up  
by the Southern Regions compared to EU guidelines, leading to some political friction 
(Giannola, 2000; Tabellini, 2005). 
In 2003, WG was charged with designing mechanisms to spend £1.2 billion of Objective 1 
EU Structural Funds (plus national match-funding). An extremely complex system of com- 
mittees was set up for each programme area, involving WG and other actors, with approvals 
given by the external Welsh European Funding Office (Gilg, 2005). Similarly, in Sardinia, 
there was a significant attempt to harmonise national and regional actions directing them 
towards the practice of economic policy agreements and contractual implementation tools. 
Despite some significant progress, non-state nation governments still face difficulties in 
constraining local authorities (Keating, 2014b; Morgan, 2013).  In  Wales,  for  example, 
WG struggles to connect the ‘business climate’ and ‘people climate’ aspects of neo-liberal 
spatial policies (Cooke and Clifton, 2005; Shipton, 2011). In the same way, the Sardinian 
regional government has also faced difficulties creating a coherent and attractive image for 
foreign investments, although neo-liberal spatial policies are not yet as common as in the  
UK due to the later onset of economic transition. Largely due to 1999 electoral reform the 
direct election of a regional President and new contractual planning processes, the stability  
of the Sardinian political framework has allowed a better control on localism and market 
pressures than in Wales
3  
(Hospers, 2003, 2005; Hospers and Benneworth, 2005; Mundula 
and Bona, 2012; Onnis et al., 2009; RAS,  2008). 
 
Regional polities and interest articulation 
The birth and evolution  of Welsh and Sardinian territorial policy communities are linked    
to regional political movements which, since the early 1990s, have pressed for the recogni- 
tion of distinctiveness of identity, cultural and linguistic bases according to principles of 
political pluralism and subsidiarity. Both in Sardinia and Wales, these can be seen as rooted 
in socialist movements in defence of the working classes. In Wales, the first decades of the 
20th-century were characterised by an economic and population boom which reduced the 
relative importance of the Welsh language and changed the political framework: after the 
First World War, the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the dominant party in Wales, 
particularly in the industrial valleys of South Wales and in 1925 the national Party of  Wales 
– Plaid Cymru – was formed, starting its slow growth (Cooke and Clifton, 2005; Davies, 
1987, 2000). At the same time, in Sardinia, Emilio Lussu and other Sardinian veterans of the 
First World War founded the national party Psd’Az promoting popular sovereignty, admin- 
istrative autonomy and freedom of trade. In the 1930s, the party won support from a large 
stratum of the population, especially former soldiers, peasants and miners (Hepburn, 2011). 
In the early part of the 20th-century, Sardinian politics often adopted an unfavourable 
position on autonomy, viewing it in terms consistent with Lipset (1975) as noted earlier. 
Plaid Cymru formally adopted a policy of independence for Wales within Europe in the  
early 2000s. Although ostensibly social democratic/centre left Plaid still struggles to transfer 
a message beyond Welsh Nationalism/advocacy of the Welsh language. As Hepburn (2011) 
notes, Sardinian parties – most notably the Psd’Az – are hampered by their ideological 
opportunism or ‘flakiness’. 
After this initial electoral success, Welsh and Sardinian political movements for indepen- 
dence faced a transitional phase characterised by subsequent alliances with national parties  
to obtain regional representatives in National Parliaments – and in the Regional Assembly 
for Sardinia. In some respects, this strategy brought positive results to both territories; in the 
1970s,  for  example,  when  the  Labour  government  lost  its  two-seat  majority,       Prime 
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Minister James Callaghan was forced to negotiate with regional parties (including Wales) 
and grant referendums on devolution  (Conroy,  2006;  Davies,  2000).  Similarly,  during  
the 1980s, the  Sardinian  territorial  policy  community  adapted  in  response  to  change  
led by the EU, Italian Provinces and Municipalities; new ideas were introduced at the      
local level on strategic planning, principles of subsidiarity and administrative decentralisa- 
tion (loosening of hierarchical and sector ties). The latter, in particular, encouraged the re- 
emergence of independence movements, identified as neo-sardismo (Demuro et al., 2013; 
Hepburn, 2011; Pala, 2012; Roux, 2006). These political successes were however followed 
by different paths for Sardinia and Wales. The former saw a progressive marginalisation      
of  independence  movements  and  their  policy  proposals  (on  bilingualism  and  free-  
trade zones – both unpopular among national parties, Demuro et al., 2013; Pala, 2012;   
Roux, 2006). Much the same occurred at a European level where Sardinia, sharing its 
electoral constituency with Sicily, lacked representation at the European Parliament.
4 
In 
following years, the trend continued due to a complex set of factors. First, due to the 
compromises of regional independence movements as they sought support from national 
parties. Second, the adoption of an essentially two-party system at the national level which 
led to the vote-seeking regionalisation of the national parties as well as facilitating a polar- 
isation of autonomist movements within left and right national coalitions.  As  Hepburn 
(2011, 2013) notes, the inability of the Sardinian territorial policy community to adapt to 
multi-level politics, developing coherent strategies at Sardinian, Italian and European level, 
is thus evident. 
The situation in Wales was rather different where alliance with the Labour party, at the 
core of national political opposition during the Thatcherite phase of the 1980s, led to a series 
of interventions in support of devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales and ultimately to  
a referendum for devolution with a positive vote (Davies, 1987; Thomas, 1992). The devo- 
lution process is still ongoing with increased primary legislative powers and taxation power 
proposed by the Silk Commission which reported in 2012.
5 
The 2011 referendum on the 
granting of further powers saw a vote of over 64% in favour, evidence of an increased public 
confidence in the Welsh Government; however, assessments of the impact of WG in its first 
phase have been critical with regard to its ability to both develop and administer effective 
regional policies (Morgan, 2016; Shipton, 2011). With regard to other sectoral interests, 
Keating et al. (2009) have shown that business interests in Wales tend to focus on the UK 
level, opposing policy divergence. In reality, the limited nature of the devolution settlement 
means that the majority of legislation impacting on business occurs in Whitehall. Welsh 
Trade unions support devolution but also derive benefits from UK level bargaining and 
regulations. The Wales Social Partners Unit (WSPU) acts as a conduit between government 
and the interest of all stakeholders, underpinning a genuine sense of pragmatism, albeit as a 
somewhat unwieldy vehicle for interaction. Broadly speaking, within Sardinia the much less 
formal structures of the Progetto Sardegna have fulfilled some of these functions, although  
in a rather limited  fashion. 
 
Discussion 
Attention is now turned to  a  discussion  of  the  material  presented  in  the  previous  
section in relation to the research  questions  posed  within  the  ‘Introduction’  and 
developed in the Section ‘Methodological approach: Analytical framework and case selec- 
tion’. These were intended to shed light upon the role of structure in both shaping expres- 
sions of, and responses to, sub-state nationhood, and by way of  a  reminder  are  
summarised below: 
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• What are the consequences of functional and economic rescaling at the regional level and 
how can we better understand both past events and possible future developments? 
• How are territorial policy communities rescaling and what might this mean for policy   
(the capacity for both development and delivery) at the regional    level? 
• Finally, though not intended to be generalisable per se, can the findings shed some light 
beyond the two regions considered in this   paper? 
 
The top-down industrial policies of the 1960/1970s represented an attempt to modernise 
the industrial structure of Sardinia. However, as Hospers (2003) and Hospers and 
Benneworth (2005) note, the lack of prior industrialisation (which can be contrasted to       
the situation in Wales) was actually problematic in this context as the new structures 
imposed by the central state failed to take into account the existing structural, economic    
and cultural realities on the ground. Thus, the new plants became largely ‘cathedrals in the 
desert’ – unembedded both in terms of supply chains but more significantly with regard to 
the social and cultural fabric of the island. More generally, the impact here can also be 
interpreted as a variant – directly imposed by the state – of the ‘Upas Tree’ effect posited by 
Checkland (1976) in which large-scale industries suppress smaller local enterprises. Wales 
has seen similar effects, although less instrumentally   so. 
Thus, a more radical interpretation of the Rebirth plans sees them as a deliberate attempt 
by the central state to ‘Italianise’ the problematic region of Sardinia (Onnis et al., 2009), to 
normalise a region seen as too distinct by ruling political classes. In this view, the suppres- 
sion of customs, language and so on is not an accidental by-product of top-down nation   
state intervention. There are parallels with Wales, although there these processes were earlier 
and less explicitly state-led. However, it is suggested that for many Welsh people these 
historical and political processes have culminated in  the  notion  that  the  Welsh  are  
‘second class citizens.. . [and] that status creates a very real feeling  of  inferiority’  
(Thomas, 1992: 10). Thus, Davies (1987: 60) has described Wales as a classic example of   
an ‘internal colony’, for which the union with England marked the beginning of a sustained 
campaign of cultural homogenisation by the central state ‘. . .  Welsh was banned for admin- 
istrative and legal purposes, children were punished for speaking Welsh    in schools’. 
As noted, the Sardinian language was formerly recognised as late as 1999 (as were other 
traditions via UNESCO). Such nation-state intervention can in fact be traced over a sig- 
nificantly longer period, with Sardinians being excluded (for example) from the civil service 
during the 18th-century. Onnis et al. (2009) thus argue that the structure of relations with   
the nation state and the institutions thereof continues to inhibit the lack of real local deci- 
sion making at the regional  level. 
Notwithstanding this view, it is certainly the case that this industrial restructuring saw 
regional institutions replaced by functional ones of the national state, disregarding (for 
example) local agriculture and the associated local mutual societies. On this subject, 
Hospers and Benneworth (2005) report low levels of trust and a lack of participation in 
civic society in Sardinia. We can think of this as social capital – with reference to Wales, 
Cooke et al. (2005) report higher levels, but it is typically local in nature and accompanied 
with low levels of trust. 
There is a broader point here around cultural and political factors and their limitation of 
constitutional autonomy; Onnis et al. (2009) put this bluntly, stating that ‘.. .imposition of 
top-down approaches to decision-making and the consequent dismantling of the traditional 
social and cultural structures has lead Sardinia’s population and the political elites to expect 
solutions to their problems from the high hierarchies in the central state’ (1330). The danger 
here of interest articulation at the national level via local elites using these links to serve their 
16 
 
 
own interest is thus clear, with the risk that significant parts of the population will view 
regional autonomy largely as a mechanism to promote demands for resources (or other 
assistance) from the central state, rather than a means by which bottom-up capacity might   
be developed. In contrast, the approach in Wales is much more towards one of partnership 
working for the benefit of ‘Wales plc’; that said there are some parallels to Sardinia with 
certain political rhetoric around achieving a  better  ‘deal’  for  Wales  from  Westminster  
(i.e. UK central government). In other words, venue-shopping still occurs in Wales, but     
less so than for interest articulation in    Sardina. 
With specific regard to identity, as Hospers (2003) describes, a bottom-up emphasis on  
the ‘real’ Sardinia, reinforcing local culture, has seen some success albeit on a relatively 
small scale. During the  mid  to  late  2000s,  ‘Progetto  Sardegna’  (Sardinian  Project)  led 
by Renato Soru promoted high-quality tourism, giving more attention to community entre- 
preneurship and the preservation of Sardinian identity. In recent years, the Project has  
stalled somewhat in the absence of extensive linkage with other sectors both within and 
outside the region which might facilitate more innovative approaches; this can be inter- 
preted as the lack of an effective policy community. With some remarkable similarities, 
Clifton (2011, 2017) shows that Wales has also began to use its culture and identity instru- 
mentally as a resource in branding (both via products and the region itself), ironically 
stymied to a degree by some of the Welsh Government’s own activities in the external 
projection of regional  image. 
In particular, from this analysis, we can identify some common trends, summarised here 
according to the key components of the conceptual framework developed in the Section 
‘Methodological approach: Analytical framework and case selection’. With regard to 
territorial policy communities, within non-state nations these are rescaling, embracing a 
multi-level policy concept. The success of development policy depends upon the confidence 
of sub-national government with these bodies, especially in (a) establishing alliances with 
European and national parties so as to obtain regional representatives supporting devolu-  
tion in the legislative bodies, and (b) coordinating local authorities in order to mediate 
excessive  localism. In relation to institutional rescaling, non-state nations have two key  
new tasks: to coordinate relationships between nation states and local authorities, and to 
integrate European programs within ‘ordinary’ regional development policy. Often this 
requires administrative reforms whose success is mainly linked to (a) the acquisition of 
primary legislative powers and taxation powers – see latest referendum in Wales in relation 
to the outcomes of the Silk Commission, and the free-zone (enterprise zone) proposals in 
Sardinia; and (b) a clear definition of the ‘administrative space’ thus avoiding the over- 
lapping of competences and giving a precise limit to private intervention (reference is made 
here to the two-tier administrative systems in the UK which are potentially open to capture 
from public–private urban development bodies, and the speculative urbanism which fol- 
lowed the abolition of the Provinces in Sardinia). Ultimately, it was though the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 which forced both nation states to move on this centralism. Turning to 
functional rescaling, the transition towards a knowledge-based economy has had a strong 
influence upon non-state nations in terms of their functions and operational tools. Becoming 
central to economic development policy after the failure of national interventions for dis- 
advantaged areas, sub-nation level governments have essentially renounced their own devel- 
opment role to become intermediaries between nation state and local authorities in the 
implementation of European programmes (in Wales adopting a precautionary economic 
policy, in Sardinia using structural funds as ‘extra’ resources to strengthen ongoing 
intervention). 
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Conclusions and implications for further research 
This paper has sought to employ a comparative study to investigate the role of structure in 
shaping expressions of, and responses to, sub-state nationhood. The role of non-state  
nations’ identity and agency regarding their relations to existing territorial states has been 
explored, with a particular focus on the means by which such regions might express their 
individuality. The idea of the territorial policy community was applied as a lens through 
which to make cross-national comparisons in the broader context of state rescaling and 
changing regimes of economic development policy, within the broader theoretical frame- 
work derived from the concept of new regionalism. The authors suggest that this is an 
interesting and indeed valuable exercise, allowing as it does for the exploration of evidence 
‘on the ground’ of the processes involved. We are convinced that the two non-state nations 
that we employ as case studies – Wales and Sardinia – provide an interesting and relevant 
contribution to debates around the spaces for political exchange and interest articulation,    
not least as they bring together different state structures and traditions, cultures, and pol- 
icies. However, they also provide sufficient commonality as variants of the non-state nation 
typology that meaningful comparisons can be made and insightful parallels drawn. 
There are examples from the Sardinian case of the detrimental effects of top-down indus- 
trial policies on the already weakened indigenous capacities and local identity of a region, 
albeit later (partially at least) reasserted via the instrumental use of regional culture and 
identity. Wales has seen some similar developments albeit less overtly political. Devolution 
in Wales is (for the moment) partial and asymmetric; despite this, the venue-shopping 
approach to interest articulation has largely given way to an increasingly coherent territorial 
policy community – more so than in Sardinia. The experience of territorial policy commu- 
nities in Wales and Sardinia shows how autonomist movements, although growing, are able 
to obtain a significant political outcome only when their needs are aligned with those of 
national governments – or even to those of the opposition in the national parliament. Both 
parties, non-state nations and national state, are then linked by opportunistic relationships 
based on political and electoral support. In both examples, the legacy of past norms and 
structures is evident, which to a degree has constituted a rather weak foundation for real 
autonomy – more so for Sardinia as ‘type 2’ none-state nation, but also an issue for Wales. 
Moreover, we should ultimately keep in mind the constraints on regional governments given 
the resources and levers available to effect significant change on outcomes, even if the 
‘correct’ course of action can be identified. For sub-national governments more generally,    
it may be that the following are necessary but not sufficient in seeking to do so; the acqui- 
sition of primary legislative and tax-raising powers, establishing alliances at both the 
European and national levels, and recalling Hepburn (2011, 2013) – becoming adept at 
multilevel policy formation and delivery. For the use of local traditions, skills, and so on      
to be most effective for ‘ordinary regions’ (the beginnings of which we have seen in both case 
study regions), the continued devolution of policymaking and its inherently centralised 
institutions and associated policy levers (not just governments per se, but  also  banks,  
bodies concerned with innovation, the law and so on) from the central state to the local    
level may be strongly needed. 
The study presented here has of course limitations and constraints; we have for example 
briefly attempted to quantify the scope of sub-national governments to effect  genuine  
change here, but a much more  comprehensive  and  sophisticated  attempt  to  investigate 
this – again cross-nationally – might represent a fruitful area for further research. We      
have employed a rather broad-brush approach when considering the comparative policy 
formation and the institutions therein, so again further research could seek to investigate  the 
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subtleties of these relationships at a much deeper level in an approach analogous to the one  
of ‘innovation biographies’, i.e. tracing a policy development from genesis to implementa- 
tion incorporating a holistic mapping of all actors, institutions, and processes involved. On 
these points, there is a growing body of literature (some of it touched on herein) around how 
the quality of institutions impacts upon regional outcomes. If it is indeed the case that as per 
Rodr'ıguez-Pose (2013), we should fit the local policy to the institutions available rather than 
vice versa, the investigation of what these might actually mean in practice  should  be a 
useful exercise. 
The development of a different level of analysis may also be interesting; within this paper, 
the role of institutions has been the focus of analysis; less so variations in the operation of 
the politicos that seek to guide them. Perhaps a further development of the role of cultural 
transmission in these processes as outlined by Mokyr (2016) may shed light; similarly, Wales 
has seen relatively stable internal politics since the inception of devolution – this could 
reasonably lead to expectations of policy persistence and institutional stability but this 
has not been the case. Three potentially useful areas to investigate suggest themselves 
here, one being the region – nation angle in that the Welsh Labour Party is ultimately a 
branch of a UK level party – unlike other regional or nationalist parties (obviously caveats 
exist in that there can be quite significant differences between branches of a single party 
while conversely separatist parties may have similar agendas to unconnected parties at the 
nation state level). The second area to investigate could be the lack of a mature specialist 
departmental structure within regional governments which has the capacity to enact and 
ensure persistence, thus mitigating against cronyism and the promotion of ‘pet’ projects. 
Third, an empirical investigation of the territorial policy community as a whole (mapping 
actors, institutions and linkages) would be a potentially valuable contribution. Finally, at 
the time of writing, the elephant in the room is of course Brexit and the form that this will 
ultimately take – what powers for example risk being re-captured by the nation state from 
devolved administrations within the UK. These are all issues to address if, in the words of 
Adam Price
6  (2015), devolution is to be more than merely a ‘dented shield’ against the worst  
excesses of the nation  state. 
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Notes 
1. The election in 1982 and 1984 of Mario Melis, as yet the only President of the Sardinia Region from 
the nationalist party Partito Sardo   d’Azione. 
2. Italian:  Comprensori  dello Sviluppo. 
3. Political stability has favoured a new season for regional enterprises incentives, accompanied by 
technical support, training opportunities and an institutional ‘MICE-oriented’ territorial marketing 
strategy (i.e. a strategy oriented to Meetings, Incentives, Congresses and Exhibitions – MICE). 
4. Only in May 2014 did Sardinia gain a representative, with Renato Soru (a former Sardinian 
President) of the (centre-left) Democratic Party winning support in both islands. 
5. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140605075122/ and http://commissionondevolutionin 
wales.independent.gov.uk/ 
6. The Member of the Welsh Assembly for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr. 
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